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INTRODUCTION

There is a general consensus that the Bankruptcy Code (the
Code)' and both state and federal environmental protection laws
are directly in conflict with one another.2 Not all of those who

I 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 - 1330 (1988).
2 See, e.g., In re Combustion Equip. Assocs., 838 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1988). Chief
Judge Feinberg noted in his opinion that:
The underlying issues in this case involve a conflict between two important national policies reflected in two statutes: the Bankruptcy
Code and CERCLA. The conflict begins at a basic level, because the
goal of CERCLA-cleaning up toxic waste sites promptly and holding
832
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are confronted with a problem that necessitates resort to the
Code and to the various environmental statutes, however, agree
that a conflict exists.' This conflict, whether perceived or real,
has produced several controversial bankruptcy decisions that
have resulted in seeming preferential treatment for environmental problems. 4 One important area of the Code where this preferential treatment has surfaced is in the use of the administrative
expense provision.5 The administrative expense category receives attention because the Code elevates these expenses above
all other unsecured claims 6 when either liquidating under chap-

ter 77 or reorganizing the bankrupt's estate under chapter 11. a
Treating environmental cleanup costs as administrative expenses
can effectively destroy any hope of unsecured creditors recovering in a bankruptcy proceeding. 9
There are important public policies behind environmental
laws such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),' which attempts
to provide an inclusive response agenda for prior hazardous
waste activities." Other laws seek to create a regulatory program
liable those responsible for the pollution-is at odds with the premise
of bankruptcy, which is to allow debtors a fresh start by freeing them
of liability.
Id. at 37.
3 See Cosetti & Friedman, Midlantic National Bank, Kovacs and Penn Terra: The
Bankruptcy Code and State Environmental Law-Perceived Conflict and Options for the
Trustee and State Environmental Agencies, 7J. L. & CoM. 65, 67 (1987) (in discussing
Midlantic National Bank, the authors fault the Court for having perceived a conflict
to exist between state environmental law and the Code, and they postulate that the
issue could be resolved within the framework of bankruptcy proceedings).
4 See, e.g., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474
U.S. 494, 507 (1986) (bankruptcy trustee cannot abandon toxic lands that are a
burden to an estate because of threat to environment and public health and safety).
5 11 U.S.C. § 503 (1988). This provision allows for the payment of certain
types of expenses that are incurred when administering a debtor's estate. See id.
The Code section ranks the payout, presumably by importance, of what are considered the usual expenses incurred in bankruptcy proceedings. See infra note 22.
6 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988). Section 507 states that, "(a) [tihe following expenses
and claims have priority in the following order: (1) [flirst, administrative expenses
allowed under section 503(b) of this title ..... Id.
7 11 U.S.C. §§ 701 - 766 (1988).
8 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101 - 1174 (1988).
9 See, e.g., In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc. 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1985)("The court recognizes that this decision [to award administrative expense
priority] will deplete the assets of the estate... [and] is achieved at the expense of
the creditors of the debtor.")
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 - 9675 (1988).
11 J. ARBUCKLE, N. BRYSON, D. CASE, C. CHERNEY, R. HALL, J. MARTIN, J. MILLER,
M. MILLER, W. PEDERSEN, JR., R. RANDLE, R. STOLL, T. SULLIVAN & T. VANDERVER,
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to track present waste activities from "cradle to grave"' 2 or to
force property owners to establish a hazardous waste cleanup
13
plan when seeking to close, transfer or sell certain properties.
Despite their lofty purpose, there is some question as to the validity of the special treatment which cleanup costs are afforded in
14
a bankruptcy proceeding.
The purpose of this comment is to explain the operation of
the Code's administrative expense priority. In addition, this
comment will explore the general policy behind several relevant
state and federal environmental statutes. Next, this comment will
examine the alleged conflict of these two policies by examining
prior case law. In particular, there will be a discussion of In re
T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 5 Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube &
Metal Co.) 16 and In re Stevens 17 . Finally, this article will address
both the soundness of the environmental claim priority and the
judicial method of handling this issue.
(9th ed. 1987) [hereinafter Handbook]. The
authors pointed out that CERCLA's primary purposes are to render enforcement
authority and funding for responding to dangerous waste substance spills and for
decontaminating the thousands of hazardous waste locations that have been created over the past decade in this country. Id.
12 Id.
'3 See, e.g., Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA), N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:1K-6 to -35 (West 1990). Section 13:IK-1 1(a) states that "[t]he provisions of
any law, rule or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding, the transferring of an
industrial establishment is contingent upon the implementation of the provisions of
this act." Id. at § 13:1K-I1.
An ECRA plan is not always necessary when the use of the property does not
change. See id. at § 13:1K-1 l(b). Section IK-1 l(b) states:
If the premises of the industrial establishment would be subject to
substantially the same use by the purchaser, transferee, mortgagee or
other party to the transfer, and upon written certification thereto and
approval by the [New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection] thereof, the implementation of a cleanup plan and the detoxification of the site may be deferred until the use changes or until the
purchaser, transferee, mortgagee or other party to the transfer closes,
terminates or transfers operations.
Id.
14 See Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 3, at 67. The authors asserted that the
Court erroneously perceived friction between the Bankruptcy Code and the state
environmental law in Midlantic. Id. The authors claimed that if the Court had not
identified this as a conflict, it could have evaluated the claim for cleanup costs as a
claim with a known priority. Id. The Court, the authors concluded, could have
simply decided this issue on these underpinnings and avoided this confusing outcome. Id.
15 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
16 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987).
17 68 Bankr. 774 (D. Me. 1987).
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw HANDBOOK 101
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ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

Overview

Administrative expenses have been described as costs suffered by the estate, following commencement of a bankruptcy
proceeding, to "marshall, preserve, enhance and administer" the
debtor's assets.' Administrative expenses have been in existence in some form or another since 1800.19 As time passed, the
bankruptcy laws became more comprehensive and eventually included the administrative expense provision. 20 The Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 continued the priority treatment for administrative
expenses until 1979 when the current Code became effective. 2 '
The current Code addresses administrative expenses in section
503.22

B.

Section 503
Section 503 establishes the framework for an administrative

expense claim; however, a great deal of discretion remains with
local bankruptcy rules. 23 Notice and a hearing are required
under section 503(b) when asserting a claim for administrative
expenses.2 4 In addition, there is no time limit for filing the claim,
nor is there any specification as to whom the claim is to be
made.2 5 Payment for the claim is made in cash. 26 The payment
18 W. NORTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, § 12.01 (Supp. 1990) [hereinafter NORTON] (citing In re Freedomland, Inc., 480 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 419

U.S. 43 (1974)).
19 Note, The Administrative Expense Priority in Bankruptcy--A Survey, 36 DRAKE L.
REV. 135, 136 (1986-87) (citing In re I.M.L. Freight, Inc., 52 Bankr. 124, 131 (D.
Utah 1985)).
20 Id. (citing In re I.M.L. Freight, Inc., 52 Bankr. at 131-32.
21 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 64(a)(1) (1977) (repealed 1979)).
22 11 U.S.C. § 503 (1988). Section 503 states in part:
(a) An entity may file a request for payment of an administrative
expense.
(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed, administrative
expenses, other than claims allowed under section 502(0 of this title,
including -

(1)(A) the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services rendered
after the commencement of the case.
Id. at § 503(a), (b), (b)(1)(A).
23 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
503.01, at 503-3 (15th ed. 1990) [hereinafter
COLLIER].

24 Id. Section 503(b) states in part that, -[a]fter notice and a hearing, there shall
be allowed administrative expenses .. " 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1988).
25 COLLIER, supra note 23,
503.01, at 503-4.
26 Id. Collier notes that "[s]ection 1129(a)(9) provides that section 507(a)(1)
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and timing of administrative expense claims rests within the
bankruptcy court's discretion.27
1. Priority
While section 503 defines administrative expenses, section
507 of the Code holds the key to their importance.28 Section 507
elevates administrative expenses to the highest level among all
unsecured creditors. 29 Simply having a claim adjudged an administrative expense entitles the claimant to priority over all
other unsecured general creditors. 30 The purpose of elevating
these expenses is to encourage third parties to conduct business
with the estate.3 ' The goal envisioned as a result of this priority
treatment is to either rehabilitate the debtor's estate or preserve
the estate's assets.32 In either case, the creditors will receive a
benefit.33 Without an administrative expense priority provision,
a creditor would not be willingly to assume the risk of transacting
business with the estate because there would be no reasonable
assurance of payment.3 4 The result would be obvious, particupriority claims (referring to administrative expenses allowed under section 503)
must be paid in cash on the effective date of the plan unless the holder of the claim
agrees otherwise." Id. The reference to a plan has slightly different results in each
type of bankruptcy proceeding. Id.
27 Id. (citing Verco Indus. v. Sparton Plastics (In re Verco Indus.), 8 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 2d 554 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Standard Furniture Co., 2 Collier Bankr.
Cas. 2d 274 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980); In re National Buy Rite, 10 Bankr. 380 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1981)).
28 Section 507 is titled "Priorities" and states in relevant part that "(a) [t]he
following expenses and claims have priority in the following order: (1) First, administrative expenses allowed under section 503(b) of this title, and any fees and
charges assessed against the estate under chapter 123 of title 28. (2) Second, unsecured claims allowed under Section 502(f) of this title .... 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)
(1988).
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 Cramer v. Mammoth Mart, Inc. (In re Mammoth Mart), 536 F.2d 950, 954 (1st
Cir. 1976). The court of appeals noted:
Congress recognized that, if a business is to be reorganized, third parties must be willing to provide the necessary goods and services. Because they clearly will not do so unless their claims for payment will
be paid ahead of the pre-petition debts and liabilities of the debtor,
§ 64(a)(1) [of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898] provides a priority for expenses incurred by the debtor-in-possession in order to maintain, preserve or rehabilitate the bankrupt estate.
Id.
32 Note, supra note 19, at 137.
33 Id. (citing Mammoth Mart, 536 F.2d at 954).
34 Id. (quoting In reJartran, Inc., 732 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1984)). InJartran,the
court indicated that without a stipulation like § 503, attempts to reorganize a bankrupt estate would be impinged by the necessity of prepayment for all services and
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larly in chapter 11 proceedings - trade creditors would be unwilling to sell goods or services to the estate and rehabilitation
would be nearly impossible. 5 The economic result would be
needless and wasteful liquidation at the expense of the alreadyexisting creditors.3 6
2.

Administrative Expense Qualification

There are no established rules enumerating all potential expenses which would qualify as administrative expenses.37 The
bankruptcy court is empowered to use its discretion to determine
what claims are entitled to administrative expense status. 38 Perhaps the only clear limitation is in the wording of section
503(b)(1)(A), which states that the claims must be for "actual,
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including
wages, salaries, or commissions for services rendered after commencement of the case."' 39 While section 503 provides a broad

definition, the courts have created guidelines to follow in determining whether a claim is administrative.4 ° First, the claim must
be for goods and services received by the estate postpetition 4"
and they must benefit the estate.4 2 Despite these judicially created guidelines, the bankruptcy court's discretionary power is
considered limited4 3 to the plain intent and well-established in-

terpretation of the statute.44 Any court that exceeds that limit
goods furnished to the estate, because it is likely that no creditor would voluntarily
assume the position of a nonpriority creditor to a reorganizing debtor. Jartran,732
F.2d at 586.
35 Note, supra note 19, at 137 (citing Mammoth Mart, 536 F.2d at 953).
36 Id.
37 See COLLIER, supra note 23,
503.04, at 503-18.
38 See Note, supra note 19, at 137 (citing Lerner Stores Corp. v. Electric Maid
Bake Shops (In re Electric Baking Co.), 24 F.2d 780, 782 (5th Cir. 1928)).
39 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A) (1988). See supra note 22.
40 See Note, supra note 19, at 137-38.
41 Id. at 138 (citing NORTON, supra note 18, § 12.05). Postpetition means that
the claims against the estate arose after the filing of the bankruptcy petition and
that the compensation sought was for services rendered in administering the case
after filing. See COLLIER, supra note 23, 1 503.03, at 503-15.
42 See Note, supra note 19, at 138 (citing Cramerv. Mammoth Mart (In re Mammoth
Mart), 536 F.2d 950, 954 (1st Cir. 1976)). In Mammoth Mart, the court articulated
that even when there was apparent performance by the creditor postpetition, the
creditor will not be permitted priority if the bankrupt estate was not, in fact,
benefitted as a result. Mammoth Mart, 536 F.2d at 954. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
43 See Note, supra note 19, at 138.
44 Id. (citing In re Baldwin-United Corp., 43 Bankr. 443 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1984)).
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has abused its discretion.45 The clear intent has been set by the
court's interpretations of section 503 of the Code and its predecessor, section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act.4 6
There are several types of expenses that usually qualify as
administrative under section 503(b)(1)(A): 47 the costs of operating a business, storage of property, rent and taxes.4 8 Expenses
for repairs, freight, upkeep and similar types of expenses may
also be approved if necessary to preserve the estate.49 Other specific provisions of the Code allow additional claims to be administrative.5 ° For example, claims under section 330(a), 51 which
include fees for professionals such as attorneys and accountants,
are recoverable as administrative expenses.5 2
Those who bear the costs of hazardous waste cleanup are
attracted to the elevated creditor status that the administrative
expense priority provides.53 This is especially true considering
the extremely high costs involved in environmental cleanup.54
III.

ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES AND THEIR GENERAL
TREATMENT IN BANKRUPTCY:

A PREVIEW

General Purpose
Environmental law has been described as a large body of law
that "encompasses all the protections for our environment that
emanate from the: (1) United States Constitution, (2) state constitutions, (3) federal and state statutes and local ordinances, (4)
regulations promulgated by federal, state and local regulatory

A.

45 See id.
46 Id. (citing NORTON, supra note 18, § 12.11).
47 See COLLIER, supra note 23,
503.04, at 503-18.

Id. at 503-20; Note, supra note 19, at 139-54.
503.04, at 503-20.
50 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B) (1988) (payment of certain types of taxes
are granted priority over most unsecured claims).
51 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1988).
52 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2) (1988).
53 See infra notes 111-74 and accompanying text.
54 There are conflicting estimates for the average toxic site's cleanup costs, with
the only common element being that the costs are in the millions. In 1986 it was
estimated that a typical cleanup would cost between two and four million dollars.
Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 3, at 68. A 1984 estimate was twelve million dollars.
See Comment, State "Superlien " Statutes: An Attempt to Resolve the Conflict Between the
Bankruptcy Code and EnvironmentalLaw, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 981, 982 n. 7 (1986) (comment
examines the states' attempts to give the highest priority position in bankruptcy to
cleanup claims). See also Burlington R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d 700, 702-03 (9th Cir. 1988) (estimated cost of cleanup at toxic
site being litigated was between $10 and $30 million)).
48

49 COLLIER, supra note 23,
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agencies, (5) court decisions interpreting these laws and regulations and, (6) common law." ' 55 Such a broad definition envisions
a vast array of laws and governmental agencies addressing the
subject.56 During the last decade, management of the large
quantity of hazardous waste that this country has generated, has
come to be recognized as a major environmental problem.5
Many of these statutes attempt to place the liability for cleanup
on those who created the problem.58 When these environmental
55 Handbook, supra note 11, at 2.
56 See, e.g., supra note 13; see also infra note 58 (federal government's cleanup
statute is often referred to as CERCLA or Superfund).
57 Handbook, supra note 11, at 56. According to the authors, it is the recent,
post-World War II productive power that has generated the hazardous waste problem. Id. It was not until 1976 that the first attempt to deal with this problem was
made on a national level. Id.; see also supra note 13 (ECRA attempts to control toxic
waste problems involving industrial establishments).
58 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), (b) (1988). Subsections 9607(a) and (b) are
comprehensive listings of liability and available defenses which state:
Covered persons; scope; recoverable costs and damages; interest
rate; "comparable maturity" date
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject
only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed
by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance, shall be liable for(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent
with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under section 9604(i) of this title. The amounts recoverable in an action under this section shall include interest on the
amounts recoverable under subparagraphs (A) through (D). Such
interest shall accrue from the later of (i) the date payment of a specified amount is demanded in writing, or (ii) the date of the expenditure concerned. The rate of interest on the outstanding unpaid
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laws and the Code overlap, a legal battle commences concerning
the proper party to fund the cost of cleanup. 5 9 Certain environmental statutes have addressed this problem by including provisions which protect state environmental claims from being
discharged or limited in bankruptcy.6 " The conflict between the
balance of the amounts recoverable under this section shall be the
same rate as is specified for interest on investments of the Hazardous Substance Superfund established under subchapter A of chapter 98 of Title 26. For purposes of applying such amendments to
interest under this subsection, the term "comparable maturity"
shall be determined with reference to the date on which interest
accruing under this subsection commences.
(b) Defenses
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a
person otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance
and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or
agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in
connection with a contractual relationship... ; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
Id.
In United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983), an alleged nonnegligent, offsite waste generator under the imminent hazard section of 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606 (CERCLA), was sued by the EPA for toxins deposited at various landfills.
Id. at 1107-09. The company sought summary judgment on the theory that § 9607
did not apply, and even if it did, standards of negligence rather than strict liability
should govern. Id. at 1113. The court concluded that § 9607 applied to the entire
act, as well as to § 9606. Id. at 1114.
After concluding that § 9607 applied, the court further determined that the
liability it entails is strict liability. Id. at 1113. The court found that Congress intended strict liability standards to be applied, with the exception of the few affirmative defenses outlined in § 9607(b). Id. at 1113-14 (citing Note, Generator Liability
Under Superfund for Clean-up of Abandoned Hazardous Waste Dumpsites, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1229, 1252-58 (1982)).
59 Comment, supra note 54, at 982-83. The author claimed that polluters, in
response to the environmental laws, seek protection in bankruptcy. Id. at 982. The
filing of the bankruptcy petition, according to the author, results in a conflict between the Code and the environmental laws because the debtor, creditor or government will be compelled to pay the cleanup costs. Id. at 983.
60 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f(O) (West 1982 & Supp. 1990). The
statute states in part:
The notice of lien filed pursuant to this subsection which affects the
property of a discharger subject to the cleanup and removal of a discharge shall create a lien with priority over all other claims or liens
which are or have been filed against the property, except if the property comprises six dwelling units or less and is used exclusively for
residential purposes, this notice of lien shall not affect any valid lien,
right or interest in the property filed in accordance with established
procedure prior to the filing of this notice of lien.
Id. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:lK-12 (West 1990). Section 13:1K-12 states, in
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two policies, however, arises from those state and federal environmental statutes that do not have identified special treatment. 6 ' The courts have partially alleviated this conflict by
allowing administrative claims against the debtor's estate for
toxic waste cleanup.6 2 The crux of the matter, however, becomes
whether this is the correct treatment of these expenses.
B.

Source of "Preferential" Treatment

The "preferential" treatment that environmental expenses
enjoy can be traced to two United States Supreme Court decisions: Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs i/)63 and Midlantic National Bank v.
New Jersey Departmentof Environmental Protection (Midlantic).64 While
not directly addressing administrative expense priority, these two
cases explain the 65
acceptance of an administrative expense claim
for cleanup costs.

1. Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs H)
In Kovacs H,66 the Supreme Court determined whether an
order to cleanup a hazardous waste site was a debt or a liability
on a claim, which is dischargeable in a chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.67 The Court, in a unanimous decision written by Justice
part, that the act imposes no obligation that shall constitute a claim or lien which
may be discharged or limited in bankruptcy. Id.
61 See infra notes 111-36 and accompanying text.
62 Id. See also infra notes 137-74 and accompanying text.
63 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
64 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
65 Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 3, at 91-94.
66 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
67 Id. at 275. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1988), allows the debtor to be relieved of any
debts:
[T]hat arose before the date of the order for relief under this chapter,
and any liability on a claim that is determined under section 502 of
this title as if such claim had arisen before the commencement of the
case, whether or not a proof of claim based on any such debt or liability is filed under section 501 of this title, and whether or not a claim
based on any such debt or liability is allowed under section 502 of this
title.
See COLLIER, supra note 23, 727.01, at 727-5 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1988)).
The Code defines debt as liability on a claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1988). A claim
is defined as:
(A) [a] right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) [a] right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such
breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to
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White, affirmed the lower 68
court's finding that the order was disbankruptcy.
in
chargeable
In Kovacs H, the State of Ohio brought suit against Kovacs,
stockholder and chief executive officer of Chem-Dyne Corp., for
maintaining a nuisance, polluting public waters and causing fish
kills. 6 9 Subsequently, Kovacs was enjoined from any further pol-

lution and prohibited from bringing additional waste onto the
disposal site.7 ° Kovacs, however, failed to comply with the injunction. 7 Thereafter, the state of Ohio appointed a receiver to
use the Kovacs's assets to clean up the toxic site. 72 Kovacs, however, declared bankruptcy before the cleanup was completed.73
The state argued that the judgment against the debtor was
neither a claim nor a right of payment within the meaning of the
Code. 4 The Court, however, agreed with the court of appeals
that under the circumstances, the cleanup injunction had been
converted into a monetary obligation.75 An order by the state
was dischargeable, Justice White concluded, once the order had
been reduced to a money judgment. 76 The Justice determined
an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured or unsecured.
Id. at § 101(4) (1988).
The definition of "debt" under the Code is considered coextensive with the
definition of "claim." See COLLIER, supra note 23,
101.11, at 101-44. In other
words, "a creditor has a 'claim' against the debtor and the debtor owes a 'debt' to
the creditor." Id.
68 Kovacs H, 469 U.S. at 285.
69 Id. at 276.

70
71
72
73

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

74 Id. at 279. The Court dismissed the state's contention that, because its injunction was not an ordinary commercial contract which may be converted to a
claim, it was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Id. The word claim has a broad
definition, according to Justice White, and its scope includes the state of Ohio's
injunction against Kovacs. Id.; see also Wisconsin Barge Lines, Inc. v. United States
(In re Wisconsin Barge Lines, Inc.), 91 Bankr. 65 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988) (fines from
violations of federal environmental laws are claims, and because they arose prepetition-that is they occurred before a bankruptcy filing-they are dischargeable
under section 727(b)).
75 Kovacs H, 469 U.S. at 283. The Court specifically noted that when the receiver
was appointed by the state: "[I]t dispossessed Kovacs, removed his authority over
the site, and divested him of assets that might have been used by him to clean up
the property." Id. What the receiver wanted from Kovacs after bankruptcy was the
money to defray cleanup costs. Id. [] [T]he State's counsel conceded that after the
receiver was appointed, the only performance sought from Kovacs was the payment
of money. Id.
76 Id. While the Court's decision may have been a set back for the state of Ohio
in its effort to cleanup the debtor's estate, Justice White's opinion discussed the
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that the court of appeals could not be faulted for its holding.77
The result of Kovacs H is that an attempt to enforce an environmental cleanup order secured prior to the defendant's petition for bankruptcy, but reduced to a money judgment, becomes
an attempt to collect a general unsecured claim against the estate.7" The less obvious result, but the more important result in
the context of the administrative claim priority question, is the
elevation of environmental claims above other bankruptcy
claims.79
In a persuasive concurrence, Justice O'Connor addressed
the concern that the states will be impeded by Kovacs H when
trying to enforce their environmental laws.8 0 The Justice made it
clear that the state could protect itself by classifying its cleanup
judgments as secured claims or statutory liens. 8 ' Justice
O'Connor recognized that such a classification determines the
priority of claims in the assets of the debtor's estate. 2
duties of anyone in possession of toxic property. Id. at 285. The Court broadly
posited:
[W]e do not question that anyone in possession of the site - whether
it is Kovacs or another in the event the receivership is liquidated and
the trustee abandons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or
the bankruptcy trustee - must comply with the environmental laws of
the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or firm may not maintain a
nuisance, pollute the waters of the State, or refuse to remove the
source of such conditions.
Id. The Court also noted that it was not addressing several issues in its holding,
including the impact of bankruptcy on the criminal prosecution of Kovacs, the fines
imposed prior to bankruptcy, the legal consequences which would have resulted
had there not been a receiver appointed by the state or that the dischargeability of
the injunction no longer barred further waste contamination. Id. at 284-85.
77 Id. at 283.
78 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
79 See e.g., Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Products Co.), 831
F.2d 118, 123 (6th Cir. 1987)("[T]he Midlantic and Kovacs cases have created a special emphasis on the importance of complying with laws that protect the public
health and safety."); In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774, 783 (D. Me. 1987)(Midlantic compelled the result of the case which was to grant environmental clean up cost
priority).
80 Kovacs H, 469 U.S. at 285 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor indicated that holding Kovacs's liability under the circumstances a dischargeable claim
in bankruptcy does not completely remove Kovacs' obligation or leave Ohio without any recourse to enforce the order against the assets of Kovacs. Id.
81 Id. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
82 Id. Justice O'Connor noted that the state is free to determine the classification and therefore the priority of the claim because Congress has allowed the determination of property rights in the estate's assets to be made according to the laws
of the state. Id. (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979)).
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Midlantic NationalBank v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection

In Midlantic13 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether, under the Code, a bankruptcy trustee could abandon
contaminated property8 4 as an alternative to cleaning up the
site.8 5 Justice Powell, writing for a slim majority, marked an exception to the abandonment power and held that a trustee in
bankruptcy may not abandon property which contravenes a state
regulation or law that is calculated to protect the public's health
and safety. 86 The majority explained that the exception carved
out by the Court was specifically limited.8 7 The Court examined
the history of the abandonment power of the Code and concluded that exceptions88 exist when abandonment runs contrary to
federal and state law.

Justice Powell noted that prior to the 1978 revision of the
Code the abandonment power of the trustee was a judicial creation.8 9 The judicially developed doctrine of abandonment, according to the Justice, had its limits.9" The majority maintained
474 U.S. 494 (1986).
11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988). The abandonment power is the power to dispose of
property that has no value to the estate or that may drain the estate of valuable
assets in order to maintain it. See id.
85 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 497-98.
86 Id. at 507. Midlantic affirmed the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions in
City of New York v. Quanta Resources Corp.(In re Quanta Resources, Inc.), 739
F.2d 912 (3rd Cir. 1984)(appeal of State of New York and City of New York); In re
Quanta Resources, Inc., 739 F.2d at 927 (appeal of NewJersey Department of Environmental Protection).
87 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507 n.9. The Court noted:
This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by
§ 554 is a narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or
regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or
safety from imminent and identifiable harm.
Id.
88 Id. at 500-02.
89 Id. at 500.
90 Id. The majority cited three cases to support this conclusion. d. at 500-01
(citing Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952); Chicago Junction
R.R. v. Sprague (In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co.), 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
Chicago Junction R.R. v. Sprague, 317 U.S. 683 (1942); In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1
B.C.D. 277 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1974)). Justice Powell stipulated that in Ottenheimer,
198 F.2d at 289, the court of appeals refused to allow a trustee to abandon several
barges because such abandonment would obstruct a navigable waterway-in violation of federal law. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 500 (citing Ottenheimer, 198 F.2d at 290).
Justice Powell articulated:
The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way when it comes
83
84
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that when the abandonment power was codified Congress included the "established corollary" that the trustee's abandonment power could not be exercised in contravention of federal or
state law. 9 ' The majority concluded that if Congress wished to
grant an extraordinary exemption from non-bankruptcy law to
the trustee that exclusion would have been plainly expressed.9 2
No such exemption was granted by Congress; the Court reasoned, therefore, the trustee could not abandon the property
contrary to nonbankruptcy law.93
Next, the Court examined the Code's automatic stay provision,9 4 which prevents commencement or continuance of legal
into conflict with a statute enacted in order to ensure the safety of
navigation; for we are not dealing with a burden imposed upon the
bankrupt or his property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed by an Act of Congress in the public interest.
Id. (quoting Ottenheimer, 198 F.2d at 290).
In further support, the majority cited Chicago Junction R.R. v. Sprague (In re
Chicago Rapid Transit Co.), 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied Chicago Junction R.R.
v. Sprague, 317 U.S. 683 (1942). In Chicago Rapid Transit, the trustee was prohibited from abandoning a branch rail line because a local law mandated continuous
operation. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 500-01. The majority posited that while the court
refused to forbid abandonment, the trustee was required to "condition his actions
to ensure compliance with state law." Id. at 501.
Similarly, the majority concluded that In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B.C.D. 277
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1974), provided additional evidence of the limits on the abandonment power. Midtantic, 474 U.S. at 501. Here, the bankruptcy court made an equitable decision to " 'safeguard the public interest' by requiring the debtor public
utilities to seal underground steam lines before abandoning them." Id.
91 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 501. The Court articulated that had Congress intended
for the legislation to change the interpretation of the judicially developed concept,
it would have specifically made that intent clear. Id. (citing Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1979)).
92 Id. (citing Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904)).
93 Id. The Court readily admitted that the exact contours of the abandonment
power were not defined by the cases they cited. Id. The majority noted that it was
clear that Congress did subject it to certain restrictions. Id. The Court also determined that the right of a trustee to abandon property in contravention of nonbankruptcy law had been limited in Kovacs II. Id. at 502 (quoting Ohio v. Kovacs
(Kovacs II), 469 U.S. 274 (1985)); see supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
94 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 503-04 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988)). Section 362
provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition
filed under sections 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application
filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), operates as a say, applicable to all entities, of(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance
or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced
before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a
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proceedings against the debtor, and noted that it does not apply
when the government is suing to prevent the violation of "environmental protection . . .safety, or similar police or regulatory

laws . .."' The Court concluded that the police power restrictions in section 362 suggest that the abandonment power could
be limited in the same manner.96 The majority also explained
that a jurisdictional provision,9 7 while not directly applicable, was
an obvious signal that the trustee may not abandon the estate in a
manner that violates state or federal law. 98 Justice Powell, emclaim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of
the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the
case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of
property form the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property
of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the
debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before
the commencement of the case under this title against any claim
against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before
the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1988).
95 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 503-04 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess.5, reprinted in 1978 U.SCoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5983 (1978) (emphasis
added); S. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5787 (emphasis added)).
96 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 504. The majority rejected the petitioner's argument
that if Congress had wanted to limit § 554, they would have enacted limitations
similar to those in § 362. Id. The Court asserted that the enumerated exceptions
were necessary due primarily to the expanded scope of § 362. Id.
97 Id. at 505. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982)). Section 959(b) states:
Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United
States, including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the
property in his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which
such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof.
Id. at 505 n.7 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982)).
98 Id. at 505. The Court concluded that section 959 was additional evidence of
Congressional intent that the Code does not pre-empt all non-bankruptcy law. Id.
The Court acknowledged that section 959(b) applies only to the situation where the
trustee operates the debtor's business not when the trustee is liquidating the business. Id. Nevertheless, the majority continued that although § 959(b) does not di-
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phasizing Congress's undisputed concern over the problems of
hazardous and toxic waste disposal and storage, determined that
section 554(a) did not overturn longstanding restrictions on the
abandonment power99 .
Justice Rehnquist, authoring the dissenting opinion, concluded that there is no state law prohibiting the use of the abandonment power by the trustee.' 00 According to the Justice,
Congress incorporated the abandonment power into the Code in
absolute terms.' 0 1 Further, Justice Rehnquist stressed that the
legislative history did not support the majority's conclusion that
the abandonment power may be limited under certain circumstances. 0 2 The dissent disagreed with the majority's contention
that the "established corollary" to the abandonment power arises
from three cases in particular. 0 0 TheJustice argued that none of
the cases cited by the majority rose to the level of an implicit
exception that
would support some limitation on the abandon10 4
ment power.

Justice Rehnquist also disagreed with the ruling that the
health and safety limitations specifically set out in the automatic
stay provision of the Code were influential. 0 5 The dissent sugrectly address abandonment, that section supports the Court's conclusion that the
Code was not intended to pre-empt all nonbankruptcy state laws.
99 Id. at 506. The majority concluded that Congress's repeated emphasis on the
goal of preserving the environment against toxic poisoning was further reason to
limit the abandonment power of the trustee. Id. at 505 (quoting Chemical Mfrs.
Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 143 (1985)).
100 Id. at 507 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 509 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that the value of
the property to the estate should be the only limit on the use of the abandonment
power. Id. The Justice concluded that the plain language of the statute controls.
Id. Justice Rehnquist posited:
[The statute] makes no mention of other factors to be balanced or
weighed and permits no easy inference that Congress was concerned
about state environmental regulations. Indeed, as the Court noted,
when Congress was so concerned it expressed itself clearly, specifically exempting some environmental injunctions from the automatic
stay provisions of § 362 of the Code.
Id. (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), (5) (1982) (emphasis in
original) (footnote omitted)).
102 Id. at 509-10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
103 Id.; see supra note 90.
104 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 510-12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). According to the
Justice, the new rule established by the majority is supported, at best, in an ambiguous manner. Id. at 512 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist recognized
that Congress would have drafted an exception to the abandonment power if that
had been their intent. Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(b)(4), (5)(1982)).
105 Id. at 513.

848

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:832

gested that because section 554 is not limited, unlike like the automatic stay provision, it is therefore, not intended to be
interpreted as restrictive in any way.' 0 6 Justice Rehnquist continued that neither the indirect influence of section 959(b), 10 7 nor
the equity powers of the bankruptcy court could justify the majority's decision.

08

The result of the Kovacs II and Midlantic decisions is to create
a special niche for environmental law in bankruptcy proceedings.' 0 9 This preferential treatment has found its way into the
administrative expense provision of the Code." 0
IV.
A.

ADMINISTRATIVE TREATMENT FOR CLEANUP COSTS

In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc.

One of the first cases to classify environmental claims as administrative expenses was In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc. "' In T.P.
Long, an Ohio rubber recycling corporation filed for bankruptcy
under chapter 7 of the Code." 2 While under the supervision of a
bankruptcy trustee, a former employee vandalized the corporation's plant site, resulting in the release of a hazardous chemical. 1"' The Environmental Protection Agency (E.P.A.) cleaned
up the site upon refusal by the trustee to do so. 114 During

cleanup, the E.P.A. discovered buried drums which contained
hazardous material.' '5 Subsequently, the EPA sought $24,000 in
administrative expenses from the estate and argued that section
106 See id.
107 Id. at 513-14 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). TheJustice stated that the majority's

reading of the statute is a strained one. Id. The dissent concluded that § 959(b)
should not be applied, directly or indirectly, to justify a limitation on abandonment
because there is not a grain of support that Congress intended a limitation. Id. See
supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
108 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 514 (Rehnquist, J,, dissenting). According to Justice
Rehnquist, the Code does not permit consideration of every possible equity. Id.
(quoting NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984)).
109 See supra notes 100-108 and accompanying text. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Midlantic, argued that Congress did not take environmental concerns into
account when creating the statutory abandonment power. Midlantic 474 U.S. at
509. The Justice concluded, that the Court was going beyond the plain meaning of
the statute in order to prevent abandonment when the environment is threatened.
Id.
110 See supra note 22.

111 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
112 Id. at 280. Initially, Mr. T.P. Long filed for chapter 11 reorganization. Id.
The court later converted the case to a chapter 7 proceeding. Id.
'13 Id. at 281.
114 Id.
115 Id.
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9607(a) of CERCLA rendered the estate liable." t6
The court addressed the trustee's arguments made in response to the E.P.A.'s claim."t 7 First, the court refuted the
trustee's claim that, because the trustee was neither the owner
nor operator of the facility, the estate was not liable under
CERCLA."" The court reasoned that under the Code, the estate
included the clean-up of the toxins." 9 The court continued that
the trustee was merely a representative who could sue or be sued
on behalf of the estate. 20 The court reasoned that the issue was
whether the estate was liable, rather than whether the trustee was
liable. 2 ' The court concluded that the estate fell within
22
CERCLA's umbrella of liability.1

Upon holding that the estate was liable under CERCLA, the
court addressed the issue of whether the estate's liability affected
the trustee's abandonment power. 2 3 The trustee claimed that
section 554 made it clear that he had legally abandoned the toxins. 2 4 In response, the court declared that the drums cannot be
16 Id. at 281-82. The court noted that not all of the EPA's cleanup costs could
be claimed as administrative expenses. Id. at 281. The tank which released the
toxins had previously been auctioned off and the soil that was contaminated was
never part of the estate. Id. Only the cost related to the removal and cleanup of the
buried drums of toxins was recoverable. Id. See supra note 58.
117 T.P. Long, 45 Bankr. at 282.
118 Id. at 282-83. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) provides in part that "the owner or operator of a vessel ...or a facility .... shall be liable for all costs of removal incurred by
the United States Government.
Id. at 282 n.5 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)
(1982)). See also supra note 58.
"19 T. P. Long, 45 Bankr. at 283. The court decided that § 541(a) of the Code
made it clear that the title to the drums became part of the estate's property upon
commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. Specifically, the court emphasized that "an estate is created which is comprised of 'all legal or equitable interests
of the debtor in property.' " Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982). Thus, Judge
White surmised that the estate owns the drums not the trustee. Id.
120 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 323 (1988)). Judge White concluded that the Code also
provides the trustee with the power to run the business of the debtor. Id. (citing 11
U.S.C. § 363 (1988)). The court further determined that the claim by the E.P.A. for
an administrative cost was a claim against the bankrupt's estate, not against the
estate's trustee. Id.
121 Id. at 283.
122 Id. at 284. The court concluded that the broad definition of person in CERCLA included the debtor, and therefore, his estate. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21)
(1986). In addition, the court recognized that the drums containing hazardous
materials fell within CERCLA's definition of facility. T.P. Long, 45 Bankr. at 284.
123 Id. at 284.
124 Id. The trustee, according to Judge White, argued that because the barrels of
toxin were not auctioned off with the remainder of the debtor's assets, the drums
must be considered abandoned. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 55 4 (c) (1988)). Section 554
provides:
(a) After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property
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considered abandoned because the debtor's chapter 7 claim has
yet to be closed.125 The court recognized, however, that the fact
that the drums were the estate's property during the time that the
E.P.A. cleaned up the toxins should not be decisive. 126 Thus, the
court rephrased the trustee's argument to be whether the abandonment power may be used to circumvent the estate's culpability under CERCLA. 127 The court enunciated that there was
liability on the part of the estate under CERCLA, regardless of
whether or not it had divested itself of the toxic drums. 28 The
bankruptcy court determined that public policy prevented the
trustee from abandoning the toxic drums. 129 Once prevented
of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate.
(b) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing,
the court may order the trustee to abandon any property of the estate
that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value to
the estate.
(c) Unless the court orders otherwise, any property that is scheduled
under Section 521 (1) of this title and that is not administered before a
case is closed under Section 350 of this title is deemed abandoned.
(d) Unless the court orders otherwise, property of the estate that is
not abandoned under section (a) or (b) of this section and that is not
administered in the case remains property of the estate.
11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988).
125 T.P. Long, 45 Bankr. at 284. See 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1982).
126 T.P. Long, 45 Bankr. at 284.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 286. The court emphasized that the trustee's paramount goal was not
simple abandonment of the toxins, but rather, the ultimate goal sought was to escape the estate's liability under CERCLA. Id. at 284. Abandonment, the court advocated, does not affect the estate's CERCLA liability. Id. The court also
concluded that, in the alternative, if abandonment would relieve liability, then the
estate would not be permitted to abandon the property. Id. According to Judge
White, once the toxic drums became part of the estate's property, the estate became conceivably liable under CERCLA. Id. at 284-85. The court explicated that
any attempt to transfer or abandon the drums did not remove the estate's liability.
Id. at 285. See § 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1)(1982).
129 T.P. Long, 45 Bankr. at 285-86. Judge White specifically noted that beyond
CERCLA's own provision, § 9607(e)(1), bankruptcy case law reinforces the inherent limits on the abandonment power. Id. The court cited several cases, including:
Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952); Chicago Junction R.R. v.
Sprague (In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co.), 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied Chicago
Junction R.R. Co. v. Sprague, 317 U.S. 683 (1942); In re Lewis Jones Inc., 1 B.C.D.
277 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1974), and concluded that these cases proposed that the
trustee's abandonment power is subject to general equitable principles and laws
which protect the public interest. TP. Long, 45 Bankr. at 286. The court attested
that this policy exception was equally applicable under the Bankruptcy Code and
its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act. Id. (citing City of New York v. Quanta Resources Corp. (In re Quanta Resources Corp.),739 F.2d 912, 918 (3rd Cir. 1984),
aff'd sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474
U.S. 494 (1986). See also supra note 90.
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from abandoning, the court concluded that the costs incurred by
the E.P.A. were actual, necessary costs of preserving the estate's
property and entitled to treatment as administrative expenses.' °
Accordingly, the bankruptcy 3court
granted the administrative exl
pense priority to the E.P.A.'

Additionally, the court noted that the estate's assets were insufficient to cover the E.P.A.'s costs." 2 The court addressed the
E.P.A.'s claim that it should be reimbursed by a secured creditor
of the estate based on the theory that the E.P.A. had conferred a
benefit upon the holder of the secured claim.' 33 The court stated
that as a practical matter, no benefit was actually conferred upon
the secured creditor. 134 Moreover, according to the court, the
E.P.A. was not entitled to an equitable lien.' 3 5 The court refused
to expand the risks of a creditor to include all damages13 attributa6
ble to the property in which it has a security interest.
While T.P. Long foreshadowed Midlantic's rationale, a Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision relied directly on Midlantic and
Kovacs H to find that administrative expense
priority was appro13 7
priate for environmental cleanup

COStS.

130 T.P. Long, 45 Bankr. at 286-87 (citing In re Vermont Real Estate Inv. Trust, 25.
Bankr. 804 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982)). The court advanced that the expenses' necessity
cannot be challenged because the removal of the toxins were the estate's obligation
under CERCLA. Id. at 287.
'3' Id. at 286.
132 Id. at 287.
133 Id. According to Judge White, the EPA sought additional reimbursement
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(c)(1988) of the Code which provides that "[t]he
trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to
the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim." Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(c) (1988)). The court determined that because the EPA was representative of
the trustee, it could pursue its claim under section 506(c). Id.
134 Id. at 288. The court specifically stated that:
Clearly [the secured creditor] did not receive any benefit in this traditional sense. The auction at which its collateral was sold occurred
before the E.P.A. commenced its removal action. Thus, the E.P.A.'s
expenditure cannot be considered as a cost incident to the sale of
property such as a fee for an appraiser or auctioneer. Nor can the
E.P.A's expenditure be considered as a cost of preserving [the secured creditor's] collateral. The drums themselves had no value as
collateral.... [T]hus ....
there was no value in the drums worthy of
preservation.
Id. In addition, the court did not consider any benefit that the creditor received as
a member of the general public to be directly related to the collateral. Id.
135 Id. at 289.
136 Id. at 288.
137 Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Products, Co.), 831 F.2d 118
(6th Cir. 1987).
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Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Products Co.)
The manufacturer in In re Wall Tube & Metal Products, Co. 138

chose to liquidate its assets under chapter 7 of the Code.' 39 Prior
to liquidation, the Tennessee Department of Health and Environment (TDHE) notified the debtor of being in violation of the
state's hazardous waste law.' 4 ° The debtor, however, failed to
comply.' 4 ' After bankruptcy litigation commenced, the trustee
was notified of the environmental law violation. 42 Following a
series of inspections and reports regarding cleanup of the site,
the state sought reimbursement of its expenses pursuant to section 503(b)(1)(A). 4 3 The request was denied by the bankruptcy
court 14 4 and later affirmed by the district court. 14 The court of
appeals reversed and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court
146
for entry of the appropriate order.
In reversing the lower court, the court of appeals made two
determinations. 147 First, the appellate court held that the liquidating trustee must comply with the state's hazardous waste law
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 959(b). 14 1 Second, the court determined
that the TDHE's expenses were actual, necessary expenses of
138

Id.

Id. at 120.
Id. The TDHE discovered tri-cholorethane and other substances deemed
hazardous under CERCLA. Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 120-2 1. One such inspection "revealed evidence of dumping or spilling
of various wastes onto the ground and inside the buildings, the presence of nonhazardous and hazardous substances in drums inside and outside the buildings, tanks
or vats containing sludges a tank leaking a corrosive liquid, and bottles of nitric and
hydrochloric acid." Id. at 120. Another report filed by the TDHE showed that
"drums still within the estate constituted up to four separate 'threatened release
locations' of hazardous substances. These substances, if contacted or inhaled,
could have caused as many as fifteen different health hazards, including loss of consciousness, vomiting, internal organ damage, skin bums, birth defects and death."
Id. at 121. See supra note 22.
144 Wall Tube, 831 F.2d at 121. According to the court of appeals, the bankruptcy
court denied the claim because the expenses were not within the meaning of section 503(b). Id. The court continued that 28 U.S.C. § 959(b), which "requires a
trustee to 'manage and operate the property in his possession ... according to the
requirements of the valid laws of the state. . .' does not apply to a Chapter 7 trustee
liquidating the estate." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 959(b)(1982)); see also supra note
97.
145 Wall Tube, 831 F.2d at 121. The district court, according to the appellate
court, held that § 959(b) was not applicable in liquidation cases. Id. See Midlantic
Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
146 Wall Tube, 831 F.2d at 124.
147 Id. at 121-22.
148 Id. at 122.
139
140
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preserving the estate.14
The appellate court reasoned that under the Midlantic decision, the trustee could not have abandoned the property in violation of a regulation or statute that protects the public health or
safety.'
If the trustee could not abandon in contravention of
the state's law, the court deduced, he could not maintain or possess the estate in violation of that law. 15 ' The court deemed unpersuasive the difference between the instant case and Midlantic,
namely that Midlantic involved a trustee who unlawfully exercised
the abandonment power as opposed to the Wall Tube trustee, who
failed to correct the statutory violation. 52 The court pointed out
that in both instances the detrimental effect on the health and
safety of the public was the same. 5 1 In addition, the court concluded that section 959(b) 154 of the Code imposed a duty on the
trustee, when liquidating or reorganizing
the estate's assets, to
55
not violate the public welfare statutes.
The court of appeals also determined that the expenses in149 Id. at 124.
150 Id. at 122. The court of appeals indicated that any review of the issue of administrative expenses and toxic waste must start with Midlantic. Id. at 121 (citing In
re Peerless Plating Co., 70 Bankr. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987)). The court concluded that the Tennessee Act was intended to protect the health and safety of the
public from readily known hazards. Wall Tube, 831 F.2d at 121 (citing TENN. CODE
ANN. § 68-46-101 (1986)).
151 Id. at 122. The court expressed:
In this case, the hazards were identified by the THDE's series of inspections. Wall Tube's trustee, under those circumstances, could not
have abandoned the property. If he had done so, the public would
have been faced with the same threat the court in Midlantic sought to
avoid-a continuing, potentially disastrous environmental health hazard with no one clearly responsible for remedial action.
It follows that if the Wall Tube trustee could not have abandoned
the estate in contravention of the State's environmental law, neither
then should he have maintainedor possessed the estate in contravention
of the same law.
Id. (emphasis in original); see also Peerless PlatingCo., 70 Bankr. at 943 (trustee cannot
abandon site in violation of CERCLA; cost for postpetition cleanup must be borne
by estate because of its liability under CERCLA).
152 Wall Tube, 831 F.2d at 122.
153 Id.
154 See supra note 97.
155 Wall Tube, 831 F.2d at 122. The court surmised:
[W]hether a trustee is liquidating, managing or reorganizing the
debtor's estate, his efforts under the Code remain the same-the consolidation and distribution of the estate's assets to the benefit of the
creditors. As such, that the trustee in this case is liquidating the estate
rather than reorganizing it is inconsequential, especially in the critical
context of the public's welfare. In either case, an environmental hazard on the estate's property is within the control of the trustee.
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curred were actual and necessary to preserve the estate for the
benefit of the creditors.' 56 The court dismissed the trustee's argument that allowing the state's response costs to be administra57
tive expenses works an unfair hardship on innocent creditors.
cleanup, the court decided, was
Top priority for environmental
58
judicially supported. 1
C.

In re Stevens

The Midlantic and Kovacs II decisions were utilized by a federal district court to grant administrative expense priority to environmental cleanup. 15 9 In In re Stevens,' 60 the district court held
that the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)
the costs of postpeticould recover as administrative expenses
6
tion removal of contaminated oil.' '
The debtors in Stevens had stored waste oil drums on a property adjacent to their business. 6 The DEP found that a significant number of those drums contained toxins and instructed the
Id.
The court concluded that a person cannot pollute, maintain a nuisance or refuse to remedy such conditions, and that "[j]ust as plainly, Wall Tube and later its
trustee should have complied with the State's hazardous substance laws. Since they
did not comply, despite ample opportunity... the State was compelled to remedy
the environmental health hazard at public expense." Id. (footnote omitted).
156 Id. at 124.
157 Id. at 123. The court responded to the fears of creditors by noting that:
Existing creditors are, to be sure, in a dilemma not of their own making; but there is no obvious reason why they should be allowed to
escape that dilemma at the risk of imposing it on others equally innocent. Indeed, the protection of innocent creditors would not be furthered by a contrary holding that permits creditors to benefit from
their silence while the debtor violates the law.
Id. (quoting Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1968); citing United
States Dep't of Interior v. Elliot (In re Elkins Energy Corp.), 761 F.2d 168 (4th Cir.
1985)(citation omitted)).
158 Id. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. NewJersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S.
494 (1986); Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs H) 469 U.S. 274 (1985). See also In re Mowbray
Eng'g Co., 67 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986) (E.P.A. was permitted to recover
cost of cleaning up contaminated property as an administrative expense because
court concluded that health and safety interests included suing estate's assets for
necessary cleanup); In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1985) (EPA response costs deemed administrative expenses); See In re Vermont Real Estate Inv. Trust, 25 Bankr. 804 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982) (administrative
expense priority granted to municipality which removed a dangerous building from
estate's leasehold, reasoning that it not only preserved the leasehold, but also protected public safety and welfare).
159 In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774 (D. Me. 1987).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 783-84.
162 Id. at 775.
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debtor to cleanup the site. 163 After the debtors filed a chapter 7
petition for bankruptcy, the DEP requested that either the debtors or the trustee properly dispose of the hazardous waste."
Upon refusal by the trustee to cleanup the property, the DEP removed the waste and claimed the cleanup costs as administrative
expenses.' 65 The bankruptcy court rejected the DEP's claim that
case law prevented abandonment by the trustee in this case.' 66
The bankruptcy judge determined that the DEP had not conferred a benefit upon the estate, as required by section
503(b)(1)(A). 167 The district court reversed the decision of the
bankruptcy court and granted administrative priority to the
DEP's claim. 68
'
The district court carefully noted that while Midlantic was not
dispositive, it was influential.' 6' The court reviewed several cases
which addressed the same or similar issues, and concluded that
the DEP's claim may have been entitled to administrative expense priority. 7 ° The court noted that the trustee could not
163 Id. at 775-76. The DEP discovered that 29 out of 52 drums contained very
high levels of toxic polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's). Id. at 775. The DEP and the
EPA viewed the site and concluded that the debtor's storage methods were inadequate and that a single leak in the drums would probably result in contamination of
the soil. Id. at 776.
164 Id. at 776.
165 Id.
166 Id. See City of New York v. Quanta Resources Corp. (In re Quanta Resources), 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986); In re T.P. Long Chemical,
Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). The bankruptcy court declined to
follow both Quantas Resources and T.P. Long. Stevens, 68 Bankr. at 777.
167 Id. at 777.
168 Id. at 783.
169 Id. at 779. The court posited that the sole issue on review in Midlantic was
whether the trustee could abandon property in contravention of laws which were
enacted to protect the health and safety of the public. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 498
n.2.
170 Stevens, 68 Bankr. at 779-80. The court asserted that there are varying conclusions which can be drawn concerning the validity of administrative expense priority
for environmental cleanup costs. Id. at 779-80 (citing Southern Railway Co. v.
Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Pierce Coal & Constr., Inc.,
65 Bankr. 521 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986); In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co., 56
Bankr. 918 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986), rev'd, Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall
Tube & Metal Prods. Co.,) 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987); In re T.P. Long Chemical,
Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985)).
In Southern Railway Co., a lessee sought priority status for cleanup of a site pursuant to an indemnification agreement with the debtor lessor. Stevens, 68 Bankr. at
779. The court, assuming but not deciding that the lessee had status equal to a
state claim, held that such a claim was generally unsecured. Id.
Also, in Pierce Coal, the court granted priority status to a claim against a mining
company for disturbance to the land. Id. at 780. The court determined that the
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abandon the drums in contravention of the state law.' 7' The
court then surmised that the trustee must comply with the state
law.1 72 Accordingly, the court reasoned that the trustee's failure
resulted in a valid claim for administrative expenses, provided
that there was an identifiable danger to the public. 73 Further,
the court dismissed the trustee's argument that the expenses
were unsecured prepetition debt because the DEP knew of the
contaminated oil and improper storage before filing for
bankruptcy. 174
V.

A.

ANALYSIS

Was Midlantic Decided Correctly?

The importance of the Midlantic decision is reflected in the
near-universal reliance on its rationale that a trustee cannot
abandon the debtor estate's property in the face of laws designed
elevated status was warranted because the costs occurred postpetition. Id. The
court continued that prepetition expenses only could be claimed as administrative
expenses pursuant to Midlantic. Id. Finally, the court stressed that Midlantic allowed for the priority status when an imminent and identifiable harm to the public
is present. Id.
171 Id. at 780 (quoting Midlantic 474 U.S. 494 (1986)). The court analyzed the
facts in light of Midlantic and concluded that the relevant bankruptcy code provisions had been rewritten by the Supreme Court's decision. Id. at 781. Specifically,
the court noted:
Since the trustee cannot abandon hazardous waste and 28 U.S.C.
§ 959(b) requires that the trustee comply with valid state laws affecting such property, it follows that the cleanup of hazardous waste remains the responsibility of the estate .

.

.

. Although [other]

authorities appear to offer the fairer literal meaning, Midlantic has effectively rewritten the relevant statutory provisions, i.e., 28 U.S.C.
§ 959(b) & Bankruptcy Code § 503(b)(1)(A) & 554(a).
Stevens, 68 Bankr. at 781.
The court also concluded:
Midlantic leaves no room for the estate to avoid the administrative expense attendant upon its possession of hazardous waste, except upon
the acquiescence of the public authorities whose ultimate legal obligation it is to protect the public health and safety from hazardous waste
abandoned by those responsible for its existence.
Id.
172 Id. at 782.

173 Id. at 782-83. The court concluded that the estate was obligated under Maine
law to dispose of the waste properly. Id. at 782. Because of the failure of the estate
to comply with state law, the court held that the illegal and improper accumulation
of waste oil contaminated with PCB's was an imminent and identifiable threat, and
that the expense of protecting the general public from that threat was entitled to be
handled as an administrative expense. Id. at 783.
174 Id. at 782. The trustee relied on Kovacs II to support its proposition. Id. at
782-83 (citing Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs H), 469 U.S. 274 (1985)).
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to protect
the environment and the health and safety of the pub1 75
lic.

If Midlantic's rationale is faulty, those decisions may be

equally deficient. 176 Several areas of the Midlantic decision have
been criticized as unsound.
Justice Powell's majority opinion presumed that Congress
intended to include certain exceptions in the codification of the
abandonment power. 177 By advancing the codification theory,
the Court corralled the seemingly limitless abandonment power
of the trustee.' 78 The Court analogized 11 U.S.C. § 362 of the
Code, where Congress specifically made exceptions to the automatic stay provision, to 11 U.S.C. § 554, where Congress did not
make specific exceptions.' 7 9 The distinguishing factor between
the two Code sections was that section 362, unlike section 554,
was expanded when codified. a ° Thus, the majority reasoned,
Congress had to place specific limits on section 362.181 The
Court continued that such limitations were not needed in an
unexpanded section 554.182
The Court further explained that a jurisdictional statute
which "commands" the trustee to operate according to state
law' 8 3 supported the Midlantic holding although it was not directly applicable to section 554.184 In effect, the majority concluded that abandonment had implied limits, but the fact that
they were not expressly stated did not destroy these limits. 1

5

In

addition, there were general public policy reasons that indirectly
fostered the abandonment limits.'8 6
See supra notes 111-74 and accompanying text.
In Wall Tube, the court determined that if a trustee could not abandon contaminated property, as stated in Midlantic, then that same trustee could not continue to
operate the property in contravention of state environmental laws. Lancaster v.
Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d 118, 122 (6th Cir. 1987).
See supra notes 137-58 and accompanying text.
In T.P. Long and In re Stevens, Midlantic was not specifically relied upon. These
courts, however, used the same rationale in coming to nearly identical conclusions.
See supra notes 111-36, 159-74 and accompanying text.
176 See supra note 175.
177 Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,
500 (1986). See supra note 90; contra supra note 101.
178 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
179 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 504. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
180 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 504.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988). See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
184 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 505.
185 See id. at 504-05.
186 Id. at 505-06. See suprd note 99 and accompanying text.
175
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The dissent's analysis of the abandonment provision attempted to outline the reasons why the majority incorrectly decided Midlantic.I8 7 First, and perhaps the most damaging
argument Justice Rehnquist advanced, was that the majority misread section 554. 188 The dissent emphasized, that, on its face,
the statute is explicit without any implied exceptions.' I 9 Justice
Rehnquist noted that if Congress wanted to enact statutory exceptions to abandonment they would have done so explicitly.' 90
Second, the dissent posited that the legislative history was
"scant" and did not support the majority's conclusion that the
statute codifies judge-made exceptions to the abandonment
power.'91
Critics of the Midlantic decision point out that congressional
opportunity to specifically limit the judge-made abandonment
power was not exercised when codifying abandonment in
1978.192 Additionally, the critics emphasize that environmental
statutes, such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)' 9 and CERCLA, do not codify limitations to the abandonment power. 194 These critics also assert that the Midlantic
Court acknowledged that it may have created a conflict with the
goals of a bankruptcy liquidation. 95 Moreover, critics view the
decision as encouraging a wide range of proceedings under
1 96
claims of the state's health and safety police powers.
187 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See supra notes 10108 and accompanying text.
188 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 509 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See supra note 101 and
accompanying text.
189 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 509.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 509-10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See supra notes 104, 107.
192 Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 3, at 78. The authors advance that "[t]he
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was a complete recodification of bankruptcy law.
If Congress desired to place limitations on abandonment, as it did for the automatic
stay (§ 362(b)) and for the abandonment of railroad lines (11 U.S.C. § 1170(a)), it
knew how to do so." Id.
193 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1982)).
194 Id. at 78-79.
195 Id. at 80 (citing Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507). The authors criticized the case for
leaving too many questions unanswered. Id. The authors also point out that the
practical results of Midlantic were moot. Id. at 81.
196 Id. at 80-81. This threat seems to run contrary to Congress' intent, especially
in the handling of administrative priority cases. See, e.g., In re Grant Broadcasting,
Inc., 71 Bankr. 891, 897 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (Congress did not intend to give
preferential treatment to certain creditors nor burden debtors with postpetition obligations by establishing a broad category of administrative expenses).
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Is Cleanup Truly a Benefit to the Estate?

Environmental cleanup cost priority may be subject to some
criticism, because section 503(b)(1)(A) gives priority only to actual and necessary costs that preserve the estate. 97 The decisions allowing administrative priority generally conclude that
because the estate's liability is unavoidable under CERCLA or
the appropriate state law, the expense of disposing of the liability
is actual and necessary within the meaning of section
503(b)(1)(A). t 98
Even if it is conceded that the cleanup costs are necessary,
the question still remains whether these expenses preserve the
estate as required by section 503.' 99 As previously noted, an essential element of an administrative expense is the procurement
of a benefit. 20 0 That benefit, at least in chapter 11 proceedings,
must enhance the value of the estate and make it more likely that
new creditors will do business with the estate.20 ' In Stevens, it was
emphasized that cleanup would confer a benefit because it would
prevent increased liability in the event of a spill.20 2 Wall Tube and

T.P. Long, however, did not specifically point to any preservation
of the estate that ostensibly benefitted the creditors.20 3 In fact, as
noted in the cases, the payment of cleanup costs either completely destroyed or severely limited any hope of payment to the
unsecured creditors. 20 4 The preservation of the estate issue is
open to criticism because often there is little or no value left in
the estate following cleanup.20 5 Some courts would respond that
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988). See supra note 22.
198 See, e.g., In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc. 45 Bankr. 278, 286-87 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1985). According to the court, the cleanup expense's necessity cannot be
challenged because the removal of the toxins was required under CERCLA. Id. at
286.
199 See supra note 22.
200 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
201 Note, supra note 19, at 137.
202 In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774, 778 (D. Me. 1987). The court specifically found
that "the cleanup did confer benefit on the debtors' estate by bringing the estate
into compliance with the cleanup mandate of state and federal law and by protecting the estate from the increased liability which would result in the event of a spill."
Id.
203 See supra notes 132-34, 151 and accompanying text.
204 See, e.g., Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831
F.2d 118, 123 (6th Cir. 1987) (creditors contended that making the cleanup costs
an administrative expense was unjust to generally blameless creditors who would
be deprived of recovery because of a higher priority claim); In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 287 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (court acknowledged that its
decision would expend the estates assets).
205 See supra note 205.
197
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this is a risk with which an unsecured creditor should be burdened, rather than the state and federal government, and ultimately the public.2 °6
C.

Secured Creditors and Cleanup Costs

The T.P. Long court denied the E.P.A.'s request that part of
its expenses should be recoverable under 11 U.S.C. § 506(c). 2 °7
The E.P.A., standing in the place of the trustee, argued that it
acted on behalf of the secured creditors, therefore, entitling it to
full reimbursement from the secured assets. 20 8 The central issue

the court focused on was whether a benefit was conferred upon
the secured collateral and, therefore, on the secured creditor.20 9
The court concluded that this expense was not one of the traditional types that are normally considered a benefit under section
506(c), which allows the creditor to either preserve or gain the
benefit of its collateral. 21 0

The court emphasized that the

E.P.A.'s claim was neither an incidental cost of selling the collateral, nor a benefit to the creditor's collateral. 21 ' The court reasoned that the property had already been sold prior to cleanup
and the drums, as collateral, had no value to preserve.212
The court did recognize that if the E.P.A. could show it had
discharged a liability of the secured creditor, a benefit may have
been conferred. 2 " The court, however, did not discover a benefit for two reasons: (1) if collateral poses a threat to the public,
the creditor is not obligated to assume possession or to insure
against the risk, and (2) a creditor is not an owner or operator as
206 See e.g. Reading v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968)(general creditors must bear
the risk of loss rather than others equally innocent"); T.P. Long, 45 Bankr. at 287
(EPA's success in receiving administrative priority is at the expense of the general
creditors).
207 See supra notes 132-136 and accompanying text.
208 See supra note 133.
209 See supra note 134.
210 TP. Long, 45 Bankr. at 287-88. The court noted that the traditional costs that
preserve the secured creditors' claims are "appraisers' fees, auctioneers' fees, advertising costs, moving expenses, storage charges and repair and maintenance
506.06, at 506-53 to 64 (15th ed.
costs." Id. (citing COLLIERS, supra note 23,
1990); In re Trim-X, Inc., 695 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1982); In re New-Deli Corp., 19
Bankr. 175 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1982); First Nat'l Bank v. Hamilton (In re Hamilton),
18 Bankr. 868 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982)).
211 Id. at 288
212 Id. The court also noted that benefit to the general public, of which the secured creditor is a member, was insufficient because it was unrelated to the secured
creditor's claim. Id.
213 Id. at 288.
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defined under CERCLA. 4 The court effectively concluded that
secured creditors are free of the policy considerations that burden unsecured creditors by limiting
claims against secured collat2 15
eral to the traditional ones.
A secured creditor is able to avoid the quagmire that an unsecured creditor endures when confronted with environmental
cleanup costs. 2 1 6 On the one hand, the courts have prevented
the trustee from abandoning a toxic site which effectively eliminates the unsecured creditor's chance of recovery21 7 and on the
other, have chosen to allow a secured creditor to abandon collateral that would pose the same risk to the public. 218 This treatment seems inconsistent when considering Midlantic's purpose of
protecting public 19health and safety without forcing the public to
2
assume the cost.

D. Private Action
Most of the cases discussed have dealt with the state or federal government seeking administrative expense priority through
the use of environmental laws.22 ° While the courts favor the imposition of priority treatment for the federal and state government claims, treatment has not been as favorable for
nongovernment creditor claims. 2 2 1 This inconsistent treatment
214 Id. at 288-89. The court, as a matter of policy, refused to add the risk of
collateral causing contamination to the existing risks of the secured creditor. Id.
The court continued that the definition of "owner and operator" under CERCLA
does not include someone who holds "indicia of ownership" that protects a security
interest unless there is some participation in the management of the collateral. Id.
Cf. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990) (secured
creditor may be liable under CERCLA as an owner or operator, even though it was
not an actual operator, because it had some degree of participation in management
through its advance of credit to the debtor).
215 T.P. Long, 45 Bankr. at 288-89.
216 See supra notes 111-74 and accompanying text. Cf.J. NORTON & W. BAGGETr,
LENDER LIABILITY LAW AND LITIGATION § 12.03[2](1991)(indication that 1986 revision of CERCLA fosters limited ability of secured creditor to avoid liability when it
forecloses).
217 See supra notes 83-99 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text. It has been suggested that
Midlantic has the same impact on both secured and unsecured creditors (although
possibly not to the same degree); if the trustee is unable to abandon the property,
he must use all the assets, including the secured ones, to clean up the site. See, e.g.,
In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 924-25 (3d Cir. 1984 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (Code should not be construed to destroy the interests of a creditor, and
that if it is found to destroy those interests, it may be an unconstitutional taking).
219 See supra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
220 See supra notes 111-74 and accompanying text.
221 See Southern Railway Co. v.Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1985).
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may be questionable in light of the extension of Midlantic's rationale by other courts.2 22
In Southern Railway Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co. (In reJohnson Bonze
Co.),223 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals refused to grant the

22 4
debtors, Southern Railway, an administrative expense priority.

The adjacent landowner and the debtor entered into an agreement whereby the debtor could use Southern's drainage ditch
provided that the debtor maintained the ditch and indemnified
the landowner for any liability resulting from the use of the
ditch. 225 Basing its reasoning primarily on Kovacs II, the court
stressed that the claimant's right could not be subrogated any
higher than the state's cleanup claim.22 6 The court held that because Kovacs II was controlling, the bankruptcy court did not
have the authority to raise Southern's unsecured claim to the position of a secured lien on the proceeds from the sale of
property.22 7
Even if it was once the controlling case regarding environmental law claims, Kovacs II cannot be looked at in isolation.228
Midlantic has become the leading case concerning the inquiry as
to environmental claim priority.22 9 It is clear from Midlantic that
state and federal orders to clean up polluted estates cannot be
avoided.23 ° Of additional concern is land that is polluted but is
not part of the estate. If the debtor was legally bound to pay for
the cleanup costs of the non-estate property, the government
would be entitled to administrative expense priority under the
222 See supra notes 112-72 and accompanying text.
223 758 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1985).
224 Id.
225 Id.

at 141.
at 139.

226 Id. at 141.

The court enunciated:

Assuming without deciding that there is some legal basis for the recognition of such a subrogation right, it can rise no higher than that of
the SCDHEC [South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control]. In Ohio v. Kovacs .

.

. the Supreme Court held that

Ohio's injunction directing the cleanup of a hazardous waste site was
no more than a general unsecured claim. In this case, South Carolina's administrative order had not even been reduced to judgment.
Thus, the claims to which [the adjacent landowner] seeks to be subrogated, a general unsecured claim, in no way improves its priority.
Id.
227 Id. at 142. Johnson, the debtor-in-possession, sold his interest in his plant to
Perry Machinery Corp. Id. at 139.
228 See supra note 150.
229

Id.

230 See supra note 90. The bankrupt estate's trustee is prohibited from abandoning contaminated property. Id.
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reasoning of Midlantic in the event the debtor or the trustee of

the estate refused.23 1
Substituting a third party in place of the state should not alter the equation.2 3 2 The third party is compelled to follow the
state or federal cleanup order which in turn saves the government agency the effort and expense of cleanup.25 3 It seems unreasonable that the agency is entitled to cleanup priority, but the
third party is not. 23 4 Both have the same impact on a bankrupt
estate-relieving it of a legal liability to cleanup the site.23 5
E.

"Superlien" Alternative

As noted earlier, state law is not completely preempted by
the Code.23 6 Accordingly, some states have circumvented the
problems resulting from the conflict of the Code and environmental laws by the use of statutory environmental liens.23 7 In
fact, it is each state's law that establishes the priority of creditors,
based on its requirements for perfecting security interests and
for the imposition of statutory liens. 2 38 Thus, the states and federal government can statutorily determine the priority of envi23 9
ronmental claims in bankruptcy.
231 See supra note 151-55 and accompanying text.
232 See Juniper Dev. Group v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transp.) 73 Bankr. 494
(Bankr. D. Mass 1987)(transferee of a contaminated property, who was forced by
the EPA to cleanup site, was entitled to recover damages from transferor's estate
under administrative expense priority); cf Southern Railway Co. v. Johnson Bronze
Co. (In reJohnson Bronze Co. 758 F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1985)(contractual indemnification claim not superior to claims of general unsecured creditors).
233 See supra note 232.
234 Id.
235 See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text. It is questionable whether
there is any benefit to the estate for environmental claims under either § 503 or
§ 506. See supra notes 199-206 and accompanying text. That requirement, however, has been loosely construed to include the alleviation of liability from environmental claims. See, e.g., supra note 130.
236 See supra note 82. Justice O'Connor noted the state's ability to establish lien
priority. Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs H), 469 U.S. 274, 285-86 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
237 See Comment, supra note 54, at 1005-10. Three states, NewJersey, Massachusetts and New Hampshire have enacted the "superlien" provision. Id. at 1005-06.
New Jersey's provision is the most comprehensive. Id. at 1007. See also J. NORTON
& W. BAGGETT, supra note 216, § 12.03 [3] at 12-22 n.43 (eleven states grant priority statutes for cleanup - Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas).
238 See Comment, supra note 54, at 1006-07. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, adopted by most states in some form, plays a role in nearly every bankruptcy
(citing Moo, The Secured Creditor in Bankruptcy, 47 AM. BANKR. L.J. 23 (1973)).
239 Id.
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Statutory liens are defined as "lien[s] arising solely by force
of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions. ' 24 0 Such
liens are generally not voidable in bankruptcy. 2 4' The environmental statutory liens prioritize themselves ahead of normally
higher priority claims and liens of other creditors.2 4 2 The
"superlien" encompassed in the New Jersey Spill Compensation
and Control Act ("Spill Act") 2 43 is considered the most farreaching of the environmental statutory liens.2 4 4 The invocation
of the superlien would grant the state a first priority claim over
secured creditors, other creditors and lienholders.2 4 5 More importantly, it is not only the property subject to the cleanup that is
affected.2 4 6 All property of the estate is subject to the lien, mak247
ing it more likely that the state will recover its response CoStS.
The New Jersey superlien statute has been upheld as constitutional. 24 8 The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that the
statute was not a taking without just compensation 249 pursuant to
the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution.2 50 The
New Jersey Supreme Court continued that the Spill Act was a
valid exercise of the police power.2 5 '
The problem under CERCLA and similar state laws is that
such a superpriority or lien has not been included in those statId. at 1007 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(45) (1982)).
241 Id. at 1007 & n.210. See 11 U.S.C. § 545 (1988) (perfected lien imposed
before filing of bankruptcy is not avoidable, but if statutory lien falls within one of
the exemptions of § 545, the trustee is free to avoid the unperfected lien).
242 See Comment, supra note 54, at 1007. Not all state environmental liens put
their claims ahead of prior secured creditors. Id. at 1008. Both the Massachusetts
and New Hampshire statutes leave some doubt, due to their wording, as to exactly
what priority they are entitled. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, §§ 1-13 (West
Supp. 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10 (Supp. 1985)).
243 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 to 10-23.34 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
244 See Comment, supra note 54, at 1007.
245 See supra note 60.
246 See Comment, supra note 54, at 1007-08. See supra note 245.
247 See Comment, supra note 54, at 1008. See supra note 245.
248 See Comment, supra note 54, at 1008.
249 Kessler v. Tarrats, 194 NJ. Super. 136, 146-47, 476 A.2d 326, 332 (App. Div.
1984).
250 U.S. CONST. amend V. The amendment states in part: -[n]o person shall...
be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id.
251 Kessler, 194 N.J. Super. at 146, 496 A.2d at 331-32. The Kessler court opined
that the lien priority provided just compensation because it enhanced the value of
the estate by providing it with toxic-free property. Id. at 147, 496 A.2d at 332.
Additionally, the court promulgated that the contract clause of the constitution is
not absolute and that a permissible use of the police power can infringe on contractual rights. Id. at 140, 496 A.2d at 331-32.
240
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utes.2 5 2 Additionally, the Code has not specifically given environmental cleanup superpriority status.2 53 In order to aid the
state and federal governments' enforcement of the environmental laws without such lien provisions, courts have created exceptions that are similar to the superlien statutes by analogizing the
claims to the abandonment exceptions created by Midlantic.2 5 4
To remedy this situation, Congress or the state legislatures
can include superlien provisions into their statutes. 2 55 Alternatively, the Code could specifically address environmental claims
within its framework. Either alternative may help resolve the debate that has grown out of the wording of the administrative expense provision.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This comment has focused on the court's use of the administrative expense provision to overcome the shortfalls of the Code
and state and federal environmental laws.25 6 What was originally
intended as a way to protect or enhance existing creditors of a
debtor's estate,2 5 7 has more recently been used to relieve liability
of the estate under environmental statutes. 258 This metamorphosis arises from the increased concern for the environment that
now pervades society. The Supreme Court opened the door to
this trend by qualifying its holding in Kovacs JJ,259 and by circumventing the plain terms of the abandonment provision in Midlantic, in order to achieve a laudable goal-the protection of public
health and safety.2 60
Despite the lack of a true benefit to the collateral of an unsecured creditor, courts have decided that public policy strongly
See Comment, supra note 54, at 1005-06.
See Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 3, at 73 (Code does not grant any special
priority for environmental claims that are prepetition).
254 See supra notes 111-74 and accompanying text.
255 See supra note 101, 230-47; cf. Comment, Striking a Balance Between Competing
Policies: The Administrative Claim as an Alternative to Enforce State Clean-up Orders in
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 581 (1989) (suggesting that administrative claim provision should be broadened to prevent usurpation by the
states in handling environmental claims).
256 See, e.g., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474
U.S. 494, 509-10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (dissent noted that Congress had the
ability to exempt the discharge of environmental claims in bankruptcy, but did not
do so).
257 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
258 See supra note 128.
259 See supra note 76.
260 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507.
252
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supports the use of section 503 to pay for the costs of toxic
cleanup.2 6 ' Courts, however, appear hesitant to extend this policy to either override the claims of secured creditors 26 2 or to allow private cleanup costs to be reclaimed.2 63
The use of the secured funds to pay for cleanup may not
benefit or enhance the secured collateral. 264 As a result, courts
limit claims against secured assets to those traditionally allowed.2 6 5 Midlantic's reasoning, however, appears equally applicable to secured as well as unsecured creditors. Some legal
scholars argue that this would constitute a taking under the fifth
amendment, but the distinction may be difficult to justify considering that super priority liens have been constitutionally
upheld.2 6 6
Private claimants should also be allowed to claim administrative expense priority under the guise of Midlantic.26 7 Nothing in
the Midlantic decision precludes private cleanup from being reimbursed from the unsecured assets of an estate. In fact, private
cleanup relieves the government of a heavy burden and public
policy equally supports private and public claims.
There are clearly remedies superior to the piecemeal expansion of the administrative expense provision. The states and the
federal government have the ability to make their environmental
cleanup costs superliens by drafting new statutory provisions.2 68
The Code never intended to completely usurp state law regarding the priority of creditors' claims.2 69 Such treatment would allow the administrative claim to benefit the existing creditors,
which is consistent with its original purpose.
As for private claims for cleanup costs, it would be in line
with Midlantic's rationale to grant priority when, absent the private action, the services would normally be the kind provided by
the environmental regulatory agencies. In addition, it appears
See supra note 151.
See supra notes 207-19 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 220-35 and accompanying text.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
See In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). In
T.P. Long, the court reviewed the traditional expenses under § 506 and found that
cleanup expenses gave no benefit to the secured creditor. Id. at 288.
266 See, e.g., supra note 218 (Chief Judge Gibbons' dissent in Quanta Resources
claimed that prevention of abandonment would lead to an unconstitutional taking).
See also supra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
267 See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
268 See supra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
269 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
261
262
263
264
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that treating consistently all classes of creditors-secured and
unsecured-is consistent with the public policies behind CERCLA and similar laws. This treatment would subordinate all
other claims to the costs of cleanup. Without any substantive
change in either the environmental or bankruptcy laws, however,
the courts will continue to use or misuse the administrative expense provision.
James N. Lawlor

